

characteristics that lead to ‘artefacts with subjective feelings’ may be formally defined, within the challenge issued by Koch. The account relates to the design of machine phenomenology in neural automata, links of automata state structures to subjectivity, the importance of attractors in what can be termed ‘thought’, and how action is found in automata, leading to a consideration of volition as an influence on state trajectories. The paper includes a presence of ‘feelings’ through a consideration of cognitive phenomenology modelling. In sum, using the ‘basic guess’ that a neural automaton’s physical neural structure relates to mental structure in living organisms has led to a description of how subjective feelings may be incorporated in a machine, that is, the engineering of a machine that is conscious of being a machine.

References

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